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Abstract—Cloud computing has been adopted widely, provid-
ing on-demand computing resources to improve perfornance and
reduce the operational costs. However, these new functionalities
also bring new ways to exploit the cloud computing environment.
To assess the security of the cloud, graphical security models
can be used, such as Attack Graphs and Attack Trees. However,
existing models do not consider all types of threats, and also
automating the security assessment functions are difficult. In
this paper, we propose a new security assessment tool for the
cloud named CloudSafe, an automated security assessment for the
cloud. The CloudSafe tool collates various tools and frameworks
to automate the security assessment process. To demonstrate the
applicability of the CloudSafe, we conducted security assessment
in Amazon AWS, where our experimental results showed that we
can effectively gather security information of the cloud and carry
out security assessment to produce security reports. Users and
cloud service providers can use the security report generated by
the CloudSafe to understand the security posture of the cloud
being used/provided.
Index Terms—Cloud Computing; Cloud Security, Graphical
Security Models, Security Assessment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing provides many beneficial factors over
the traditional networks, which enhance the productivity and
performance of enterprises and individuals [1], [2]. But at
the same time, it faces many security challenges and threats,
affecting the decisions of using the cloud computing services
significantly [3]. That is, potential cloud users need to consider
various security implications before migrating their data and
operations to the cloud computing environment [4]. Although
there are various security mechanisms implemented for the
cloud, their effectiveness must be evaluated to fully understand
the security posture of the cloud. One of the widely used
techniques is to develop a security assessment framework
using graphical security models [5], [6]. These models provide
the framework to collect security data and evaluate various
attack scenarios of the network, as well as the capabilities to
incorporate countermeasure selections. However, automating
the functionalities of those models in the cloud can be a
challenge, as the privilege boundaries are more complex than
the traditional networks.
Currently, much of the security analysis for the cloud is
done manually by a security expert. In this process, a lot
of time is consumed and it can also introduce human errors.
Hence, automation is needed to reduce the cost and time, as
well as reducing human errors. There are many tools available
for assessing the security of networks [6]. For example,
NAVIGATOR [7], MulVal [8], and NICE [9] all have functions
to automatically assess the security of networks. However,
these tools require specific inputs, which are security details
of the network. Security information gathering tools, such as
NESSUS [10] and National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
[11], are easily deployed in traditional networks as typically
the whole network is under the system administrator’s control.
However, the cloud separates the privilege between different
stakeholders (e.g., clients and service providers), limiting
the access to security information that existing information
gathering tools can access to. Hence, additional measures are
needed to ensure that all these information can be collected
automatically to evaluate the security of the cloud.
To address the aforementioned problems, we propose an
automated cloud-based security analysis framework to evaluate
the security of the cloud. We present additional techniques
to collect security information from the cloud, which is then
stored in a database. As the security assessment framework
in the CloudSafe, we implement a scalable graphical secu-
rity model named Hierarchical Attack Representation Model
(HARM) [12]. We further modify the functionalities of the
HARM such that it will integrate with the security data gather-
ing interfaces we implemented for the CloudSafe. Finally, we
carry out experimental analysis in Amazon AWS to validate
the applicability and practical use of the CloudSafe. The
contributions of the paper are as follows.
• To develop security information gathering interfaces for
the cloud given privilege separation boundaries,
• To implement the CloudSafe by integrating the function-
alities of security information gathering interfaces and the
HARM,
• To conduct experiments in the Amazon AWS to evaluate
the applicability and practical use of the CloudSafe.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II de-
scribes the related work on security assessment for the cloud.
Section III presents the CloudSafe framework with details
on its architecture, configurations and workflow. Section IV
shows the results of using the CloudSafe in the Amazon AWS.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
The CloudSafe is a security assessment tool for the cloud,
which utilizes cloud resources to perform its tasks. In this
section, we review existing methods for evaluating the security
of the cloud, and also the techniques of utilizing cloud
resources for the security asssessments.
A. Cloud-Based Security Assessment
The cloud provides scalable and on-demand computing
resources, which can be utilized for the security assessments.
Martinez et al. [13] proposed an architecture for malware de-
tection based on the concept of web services and the malware
intrusion ontology. Using multiple engines that implement
heterogeneous analysis strategies, it has detected malicious
content or behavior in unknown files. Ouellette et al. [14]
proposed a cloud-based malware detection learning algorithm.
The algorithm detects malware by looking for properties that
cannot change in malware such as known patterns of malware
behavior. Shin and Gu [15] proposed ClOUDWATCHER - a
network monitoring framework using OpenFlow in a dynamic
cloud network. Chen et al. [16] proposed collecting and storing
cloud operational reports, security events, and traffic data and
using parallel forensic analysis. Khune and Thangakumar [17]
are cloud-based developers that created the virtualized and
synchronized replicas of real smart phones in a cloud environ-
ment. Multiple detection engines are run in parallel to detect
attacks, smart phone intrusion. Mahmood et al. [18] proposed
a framework for performing security tests on smart phones
using fuzzy testing in a cloud environment. As demonstrated
by those approaches, the cloud can provide substantial benefit
for the security assessments. However, almost all graphical
security models do not utilize the cloud computing resources
[6]. To improve the performance and management of security
assessment tasks, we develop a framework to utilize the
cloud computing resource for graphical security models in the
proposed SafeCloud tool.
B. Security Assessment of the Cloud
Bleikertz et al. [19] proposed a query and policy language
that could be used to specify desired and unwanted config-
urations in the network. When an attack query is entered,
it indicates whether an attack route exists based on the
attack graph. Noel et al. [20] proposed a scalable modeling
framework to create a predictive model for possible multi-step
attack paths by combining vulnerability, server configuration,
policy rules, and security events. The generated attack path
is stored in the Neo4j-based database and provides the result
of combining with the input query. Rizvi et al. [21] proposed
a framework for evaluating the security of the cloud. They
presented security evaluation rules to assess the security using
the developed security metrics (based on linear and non-
linear equations and fuzzy logic systems). However, they only
covered specific aspects of security, such as interoperability,
co-location, transparency, malicious insider and portability.
Manzoor et al. [22] proposed a new security assessment model
for the cloud using Petri Nets. They profile the operational
behavior of the services in the cloud operations, which are
then used to evaluate the security of the cloud operations in
different layers. However, using Petri Nets can have a scala-
bility problem, especially for the cloud where configurations
can dynamically change within a short period of time. There
are many other graphical security models that could be used to
assess the security of the cloud [5], [6]. However, we must first
specify how the security assessment could be carried out in
the cloud environment ensuring the data collection, processing
and evaluation, which has not been specified.
III. CLOUDSAFE
The details of the CloudSafe tool is presented in this
section. CloudSafe follows the SaaS (Software-as-a-Service)
framework that can perform cloud security analysis (i.e. a
cloud service for cloud security). Figure 1 shows the overall
process of the CloudSafe framework. The proposed framework
is implemented in the Amazon AWS (AWS for short), and it
consists of two phases. Phase 1 collects information about the
target cloud and stores the data used for the security analysis
in a database. Then, the security is evaluated using the HARM
(Hierarchical Attack Representation Model). Phase 2 generates
and stores a new HARM model by modifying the security
information collected in Phase 1. In this way it can be seen
if the security posture of the cloud changes without changing
the actual cloud configurations.
A. Phase1
Reachability of the cloud components in the security anal-
ysis is essential information (e.g., the reachability of different
virtual machines (VMs)). There are various tools for this
purpose, but it is difficult to apply them in the cloud, be-
cause the assessment tool may not have enough privileges to
access such information. To solve this problem, we obtained
Reachability using Security Group (SG), which is the basic
security method of AWS. The SG controls access using IP
and Port as packet filtering. The SG information is used to
generate the Reachability Graph (RG) by considering only
the allowed rules for inbound traffics. Figure 2 shows the
process of acquiring the reachability information from the
target cloud (i.e., the cloud environment to conduct security
assessment) and storing it in the Network Database (NDB)
and Host Database (HDB) by parsing the SG to understand
the inter-VM reliability. Then, an RG is generated and stored
in the NDB, and basic information of the host is generated in
the HDB. Algorithm 1 is used to populate the RG from SG,
which uses information. The algorithm iteratively goes over
the set of security rules to examine the reachability specified
in the SG, and continuously adding the new set into the RG.
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Fig. 1: Framework Architecture
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Fig. 2: Reachability scanning in Phase 1
Through the process shown in Figure 2, information about
the reachability and VMs included in the cloud is collected
and stored in the databases. However, the details of each VM
are unknown. The details of the HDB are supplemented in the
vulnerability scanning process. We use vulnerability analysis
tools to find vulnerabilities in each VM and store them. This
process is shown in Fig. 3. The vulnerability analysis tool is
used to scan all the VMs constituting the target cloud, and the
information is stored in the HDB. Vulnerability scanning re-
sults include open ports, services provided, and vulnerabilities.
Algorithm 2 shows the process of collecting the vulnerability
report. The module goes over every host (i.e., VMs) and
conduct vulnerability scanning. Then, the corresponding report
is stored into the vulnerability database (VDB). We use open
port information and vulnerabilities of VMs. If there is no
vulnerabilities in the VDB, the vulnerability information of
the NVD (National Vulnerability Database [11]) is retrieved
and stored in the VDB.
With collected reachability and vulnerability data, we can
generate the HARM as shown in Figure 4. The generated
HARM is stored in the HARM object DB, which is then used
to compare the changes in security of the cloud in phase 2. But
this information could also be used later to carry out other off-
line security assessments. Finally, the security analysis result
from the HARM is provided to the user.
Algorithm 1 Security Groups to Reachability Graph parser
procedure GENERATING RG FROM SG(SG,NDB,HDB)
Init RG
for All Security Rule in SG do
if RG 6∋ SG.host then
Add SG.host to RG
Insert SG.host to RG
end if
Add SG.reachability to RG
end for
Insert RG to NDB
end procedure
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Fig. 3: Vulnerability scanning in Phase 1
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Fig. 4: Security assessment in Phase 1
Algorithm 2 Vulnerability scan report parser
procedure ANALYSE VUL RE-
PORT(Report,HostID,HDB,VDB)
Init Host
Insert Time,OS,PortstoHDB(HostID)
for all vulnerabilities in report do
V ← vulnerability
Add V to Host
if VDB 6∋V then
Insert V to VDB
end if
end for
Insert Host to HDB
end procedure
Algorithm 3 Generating the HARM model
procedure GENERATING HARM MODEL FROM
DB(NDB,HDB,VDB,HARMob jectDB)
Init HARM
Read NDB
for All hosts in NDB do
Add host to HARM
Read HDB
for All vulnerability in HDB do
Read VDB
V ← vulnerability
Add V to HARM
end for
ADD Rechability to HARM
end for
Insert HARM to HARMob jectDB
end procedure
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Fig. 5: DB schema
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Fig. 6: HARM modification and comparisons in Phase2
Figure 5 represents the entire DB schema. The framework
used MongoDB and a NoSQL database. Because there are
many multi-value elements in the framework, NoSQL database
is easier to store than the RDB. However, the figure is shown
using the RDB schema because there is no proper way to
express the structure. NDB stores the VMs constituting the
network and stores the reachability of each VM. HDB stores
information about each VM. The main information is the
IP address of the host, open ports, and the name of the
vulnerability it has. The VDB stores the details of each
vulnerability. CVSS, Risk, and Impact information is parsed
by the NVD and stored in the database, and probability is
obtained from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System used
by the NVD. The attack cost value is saved as void because
there is no way to calculate it automatically (i.e., it will rely
on the monetary values of the assets in the cloud). Hence, the
user can directly enter the cost value as appropriate.
B. Phase 2
In order to improve the security of the cloud, we can deploy
security solutions based on the security assessment of the
cloud we generated from Phase 1. However, it takes a great
deal of resources to perform these tasks. Consequently, the
service can also be stopped in the process. To solve this
problem and test the security of the cloud, we propose Phase 2
that can create a new security model of the cloud by modifying
the HARM configuration that was previously stored in the DB
and evaluate their effectivenesses.
Figure 6 shows the whole process of Phase 2. In this
phase, NDB, HDB, and VDB are modified and saved in
the DB. As a result, a new HARM model is generated,
and the security analysis result of the new HARM model
is provided to the user with a comparison report with the
original HARM model generated in Phase 1. Phase 2 works
recursively to change the cloud configurations in a direction
that gradually improves the security posture of the cloud. To
achieve this, different countermeasure solutions are compared
and evaluated of their effectiveness by introducing security
changes using the HARM. There are many different ways to
deploy countermeasure selection to optimize the security [9],
but selecting the best countermeasure process is out of scope
in this paper.
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(a) Initial setup in Phase 1
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(b) Modified setup after Phase 2
Fig. 7: Relationship between AMIs and SGs in testbed 1
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
For the experiment, we setup two different cloud testbeds
to demonstrate the applicability and practical use of the
CloudSafe tool. The two target clouds were implemented in
the AWS. The first is implemented in three tiers of Web, App,
and DB, and the second one is implemented as a streaming
server. The configuration of the testbeds are destailed in the
Appendix V. We show how the two phases described in the
previous section are applied in the two cloud testbeds in the
following subsections.
A. Applying Phase 1 in the testbeds
Figure 7 shows the connections between the AMI and SG in
testbed 1. The DB only allows connections from the App, and
the App only uses connections from the Web. The Web allows
connections via http and https. All AMIs allow connection of
a specific IP from port 22, which is for using SSH.
As an illustrative example, Figure 8 shows the HARM
model generated for testbed 1. Potential attack possible paths
are calculated in HARM. Users can also retrieve graphical
view of the HARM to understand the cloud components and
their security relationships. We omit the illustrative example
for testbed 2 due to the limited space.
Table I shows the security analysis results for testbed 1,
and Table II for testbed 2. They include the security analysis
results from both Phase 1 and Phase 2, which can be compared
directly. The CloudSafe tool generates the security report using
various security metrics, and other relevant metrics, not only
security related (e.g., performance, reliability etc), can also
be implemented as additional metric modules and integrated
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(b) Configuration changes made in Phase 2
Fig. 8: HARM for testbed 1
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Fig. 9: Changes in security posture when patching vulnerabil-
ities using PSV. (a) and (b) show the risk report for testbed 1
and testbed 2, respectively. (c) and (d) show the probability of
attack success report for testbed 1 and testbed 2, respectively.
TABLE I: Security analysis results for testbed 1
Metrics
Values
Initial Modified
Number of hosts 5 7
Sum Risk 617.346 274.376
Max Risk 146.223 64.988
Or Probability of attack success 0.965529 0.894082
Max Probability of attack success 0.934753 0.702739
Mean of attack path lengths 3 3
Mode of attack path lenghts 3 3
Standard Deviation of attack path lengths 0 0
Shortest attack path length 3 3
Density 0.267857 0.266667
TABLE II: Security analysis results for testbed 2
Metrics
Values
Initial Modified
Number of hosts 5 7
Sum Risk 276.701 86.33
Max Risk 73.435 24.694
Or Probability of attack success 0.80244 0.509267
Max Probability of attack success 0.93959 0.674334
Mean of attack path lengths 2.7 2.5
Mode of attack path lenghts 3 3
Standard Deviation of attack path lengths 0.16 0.25
Shortest attack path length 2 2
Density 0.238095 0.25
with the HARM. By generating those security reports, we
can easily compare different security aspects of various cloud
environments. One note is that using the HARM, the attack
cost and the return on attack calculation functions require
the attack cost to be specified in the DB. As NVD does
not provide this cost, this function is not used in this study
(however, it can be calculated if specified by the user). Next,
we consider applying security countermeasures to compare
how the security posture changes and evaluate the changes
using CloudSafe.
B. Applying Phase 2 in the testbeds
An example countermeasure selection we deploy here is
vulnerability patching, to show how the security posture
changes using CloudSafe when countermeasures are deployed.
One way to optimize the vulnerability patching is to prioritize
the set of vulnerabilities to patch. To do this, we compute the
prioritized set of vulnerabilities (PSV) as specified in [23]. The
PSV is a method that can be applied to improve the security
of a network using the HARM. For our implementations, we
use the exhaustive search (ES) algorithm method among other
PSV algorithms. The ES algorithm uses the risk and cost
values to prioritize vulnerabilities to be patched in the cloud
testbeds. Table IV shows the PSV ranking of the testbeds, and
the result of applying PSV to the testbeds is shown in Fig 9.
We eliminated the vulnerability sequentially from ES1 to ES5
respectively, and the results show the gradual reduction in the
risk and the probability of attack success.
The result shows that for testbed 1 (i.e., Figures 9(a) and
9(c)), patching more vulnerabilities would decrease the risk
and the probability of attack success in a consistent trend.
That is, the amount of reduction is roughly equivalent when a
TABLE III: Phase1 execution time
Experiment
Values
model1 model2
Obtain SGs from Amazon 1.72s 1.74s 1.69s 1.71s
Parsing and build Reachability Graph 0.48s 0.48s 0.46s 0.44s
Insert and Update Database 2.24s 2.22s 2.23s 2.28s
Vulnerability Scanning(All Tcp) 5min28s
Scan report parsing 1.35s 1.41s 1.28s 1.74s
Insert and Update Host(AMI) Database 1.19s 1.15s 1.24s 1.12s
Insert Vulnerability Database(Including NVD parsing) 3.42s 3.69s 3.18s 3.89s
TABLE IV: PSV using ES method for testbed 1 (top 6)
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6
ID v7web v2was v5web v6web v3web v7was
vulnerability is patched everytime. On the other hand, the ef-
fectiveness of patching vulnerabilities is different with testbed
2, where the reductions in the risk and the probability of attack
success is less effective compared with testbed 1. Although
there is a sharp reduction when patching 3 vulnerabilities,
there is no significant reduction when more vulnerabilities are
patched. CloudSafe provides such security analysis for users
to view and understand how the security posture can change
when different countermeasures are applied in the cloud.
C. Overhead
To understand the performance overhead using CloudSafe,
we measure the time take in Phase 1. The time taken using
the CloudSafe tool on testbed 1 was measured and the mean
value was used from 10 measurements. Table III shows the
overhead of gathering the data to populate the DBs. It shows
that most tasks can be completed reasonably quickly (within
matter of few seconds), while the biggest bottleneck is the
vulnerability scanning of VMs. One approach to improve the
vulnerability scanning time is to reduce the port range to scan,
but vulnerabilities outside the measurement range would not
be included in the analysis. Another approach is to parallelize
the vulnerability scanning using the cloud, which we will
investigate in our future work.
Next, we measure the computational overhead using Cloud-
Safe. The use of the vulnerability analysis tools is the only
factor that that affects the VM when using CloudSafe. Fig-
ure 10 shows the load on the CPU and the network of the
VMs when using CloudSafe. All TCP/IP ports were scanned
and the load was measured in 1 minute increments. During
the measurement, CPU usage increased by up to 11 percent,
and the network had a maximum input of 5,042 bytes per
minute and an output of 416 bytes. During the tool usage
period, the cumulative input was 11,163 bytes and the output
was 1,234 bytes. Network load was not large, but the CPU
utilization increased significantly. There is need to adjust the
scan options depending on the host’s CPU performance or the
role. On the other hand, disk reads and writes were almost
unchanged.
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Fig. 10: VM resource overhead using CloudSafe
V. CONCLUSION
Evaluating the security of the cloud can be a challenging
task due to the scalability and dynamic nature, as well as the
different privilege boundaries between the stakeholders (e.g.,
cloud service providers and clients). To address these prob-
lems, we proposed a framework to evaluate the security of the
cloud using CloudSafe. CloudSafe provides semi-automated
functions to collect and store the security information from
the cloud, and also provide functions to modify the cloud
configurations and compare how the security posture changes
in the cloud. The results show that without too much user inter-
ventions, CloudSafe can collect security data from the cloud,
evaluate the security posture of the cloud using the HARM,
and generate reports that the user can utilize to assess the
security of the cloud. Further, different countermeasures can
be pre-evaluated prior to their deployment using CloudSafe to
compare changes in the security posture of the cloud.
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APPENDIX
Table V shows the AWS resources and service versions used
to setup the testbeds. Table VI shows the AWS resources
used by the CloudSafe tool (WS refers to Windows Server).
The type of those instances were all t2.micro. Table VII
shows the vulnerability information of each AMI as a result
of vulnerability scanning of the target cloud.
TABLE V: AWS resources for the target clouds
Instance name OS Spec Service
Web server
Amazon
Linux
vCPUs: 1
Memory: 1(GiB)
Apache 2.4.1
App server
Ubuntu
14.04
vCPUs: 1
Memory: 1(GiB)
Tomcat 7.2.0
DB server
Ubuntu
14.04
vCPUs: 1
Memory: 1(GiB)
MySQL 5.6.27
FTP
Windows
2013
vCPUs: 1
Memory: 1(GiB)
FileZilla 3.14.1
Streamer
Windows
2013
vCPUs: 1
Memory: 1(GiB)
Wowza 4.3.0
Vod bucket
Ubuntu
14.04
vCPUs: 1
Memory: 1(GiB)
MySQL 5.6.27
TABLE VI: Security Assessment Cloud Resource
Instance name OS Spec
DB generation WS 2016 vCPUs: 1, Memory: 1(GiB)
HARM WS 2016 vCPUs: 1, Memory: 1(GiB)
Database Ubuntu 14.04 vCPUs: 1, Memory: 1(GiB)
Vuln. Scanner Ubuntu 14.04 vCPUs: 1, Memory: 1(GiB)
Reachability Collector Ubuntu 14.04 vCPUs: 1, Memory: 1(GiB)
TABLE VII: Vulnerabilities in AMIs
Vulnerability CVE-ID Probability Risk
V1web CVE-2016-8740 0.5 1.45
V2web CVE-2016-1546 0.43 1.849
V3web CVE-2016-5387 0.51 3.264
V4web CVE-2016-4979 0.5 1.45
V5web CVE-2016-6515 0.78 5.382
V6web CVE-2016-10009 0.75 4.8
V7web CVE-2015-8325 0.72 7.2
V1was CVE-2016-5388 0.51 3.264
V2was CVE-2016-3092 0.78 7.8
V3was CVE-2017-5647 0.5 1.45
V4was CVE-2017-5648 0.64 3.136
V5was CVE-2016-6816 0.68 4.352
V6was CVE-2016-8747 0.5 1.45
V7was CVE-2016-6515 0.78 6.9
V8was CVE-2016-10009 0.75 6.4
V9was CVE-2015-8325 0.72 7.2
V1db CVE-2013-2566 0.43 1.247
V1FT P CVE-2018-0087 0.56 1.247
V2FT P CVE-2018-5310 0.65 1.247
V3FT P CVE-2016-6515 0.78 5.382
V4FT P CVE-2016-10009 0.75 4.8
V5FT P CVE-2015-8325 0.72 7.2
V1streamer CVE-2018-7048 0.5 5.382
V2streamer CVE-2018-7049 0.43 5.382
V3streamer CVE-2018-16922 0.53 5.382
V4streamer CVE-2016-6515 0.78 5.382
V5streamer CVE-2016-10009 0.75 4.8
V6streamer CVE-2015-8325 0.72 7.2
V1bucket CVE-2013-2566 0.43 1.247
